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The Zedillo's Administration's decision to devalue the peso on December 20, 1994 and
its resulting effects on the Mexican economy has clearly raised many issues about the future
economic condition of Mexico and the political stability of the Zedillo Administration.
Although a full examination of the peso devaluations effects on the Mexican economy and
political arena are beyond the scope of this note, the basic scenario of Mexico's dilemma can
be summarized in four aspects:
(1) The Administration's decision to devalue the peso and the international skepti-
cism and its motivations and rationale to do so lead to a massive and immediate with-
drawal of foreign investment capital from the Mexican commercial banks, the Mexican
equity markets (the Bolsa, Mexico's stock exchange) and the virtual abandonment of
investment in Mexican government debt obligations, all of which occurred within one
to two weeks following the devaluation.
(2) The large foreign investment vehicles whose funds provided the Mexican gov-
ernment and the banking entities with liquid capital (largely U.S. mutual funds and
pension funds) were severely affected by the devaluation, as these groups really had no
effective means of hedging against foreign currency risk inherent in the peso because at
the time the liquid derivative's market did not exist in which those managers could
effectively hedge against fluctuation from the peso.
(3) Without foreign capital to provide liquidity in the short-term in debt markets,
the Mexican government came within hours of defaulting on their debt obligations,
and thus needed immediately capital injections from the international financial com-
munity to keep the government solvent.
(4) The withdrawal of foreign capital from Mexico has placed enormous burdens
on the government and Mexican commercial banks to initiate action and thus prevent
the country from plunging into a deep recession.
Some of the results stemming from the peso evaluation and ensuing international capi-
tal flight were easily predictable, including (i) drastically higher interest rates to public and
private borrowers, and accompanying increases in inflation; (ii) a noticeable decrease in the
number of corporate securities offerings in the Mexican equity market; (iii) international
uncertainty and skepticism over the true valuation of the peso; and (iv) the danger of wide-
spread default by public and private borrowers alike. All of these factors will, of course, lead
to a general economic contraction for Mexico in 1995. However, the far more interesting
questions to consider are (i) what actions will the Zedillo Administration and the interna-
tional financial community take to minimize the effects of the devaluation; and (ii) how
will the regulatory initiatives affect Mexico's banking system, its relations with its NAFTA
partners and other international trade partners? This note provides an introductory analysis
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into these questions, and covers events and initiatives within the period of February 1 -
May 10, 1995.
II. The U.S.-Mexico Agreement & the Zedillo Economic Austerity Plan
A. THE U.S.-M Exico AGREEMENT
On February 21, 1995, the United States and Mexico reached an agreement on the
terms of the $20 billion rescue package that officials for both sides asserted would help
restore financial market confidence and lay the groundwork for recovery in Mexico. After
five days of negotiations in Washington, D.C., U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin and
Mexican Finance Minister Gulliermo Ortiz signed four agreements that Secretary Rubin
said "will serve American economic interests with respect to jobs and standards of living,
and American interests with respect to illegal immigration and national security, by assist-
ing the stabilization of the Mexican economy."1 The following four accords were signed:
1. A framework or "umbrella" type accord broadly defining the terms for U.S. aid;
2. A medium-term exchange stabilization accord that specifies the terms for swap
transactions of up to five years;
3. An agreement specifying the terms and conditions for the United States' guaran-
ty of Mexico's debt securities of up to ten years, including the fee structure to cover the
Treasury's risk; and
4. An oil proceeds facility accord under which the state-run oil company, Petroleos
Mexicanos (PEMEX), will instruct its foreign customers to make payments for oil
exports into an account at a U.S. bank, to be transferred to the Bank of Mexico's
account at the New York Federal Reserve Bank for the U.S. Treasury to tap if Mexico
fails to repay the United States under any of the financing agreements.2
In his remarks at the signing ceremony in the Treasury Department, Secretary Rubin
said that Mexico has made the commitment of taking the difficult measures needed for eco-
nomic stabilization. 3 He further stated that the U.S. disbursement of funds will depend
upon determinations that the Mexican government and the Banco de Mexico are pursuing
the policies agreed upon with the U.S. Treasury and the International Monetary Fund,
which likewise approved a $17.8 billion loan to Mexico on February 1, 1995. The central
focus of these measures is for Mexico to maintain a tight monetary policy, press ahead with
privatization and structural reforms, and adopt transparency in its financial operations.4
1. See 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 342 (Feb. 22, 1995). For a description of President
Clinton's Executive Order aiding Mexico with the U.S. $20 billion package, see 12 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 5, at 221 (Feb. 1, 1995).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. For an analysis of the Mexican and U.S. Legislature objections to President Clinton's rescue
package, see Mexican 6- U.S. Legislators Raise Strong Objections to President Bill Clinton's Rescue
Package for Mexican Economy, SourceMexc Economic News & Analysis on Mexico (U.N.M. Mar.
8, 1995).
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The U.S. financial aid involves three types of support: short-term swaps through which
Mexico may borrow U.S. dollars for ninety days; medium-term swaps that will extend U.S.
dollars to Mexico for up to five years; and U.S. guarantees of Mexico's obligations on govern-
ment securities for up to ten years, which is aimed at convincing investors to lend money to
Mexico for longer terms at lower interest rates.5 The U.S. financing was intended to help
Mexico meet its Tesobono obligations (the bonds that are payable in pesos but pegged to
U.S. dollars) and will refinance and restructure its short-term debt obligations. 6 Mexico is
expected to refinance $16 billion of the $21.5 billion in Tesobonos that remain outstanding.
In addition, the U.S. financing is also expected to help Mexico strengthen its banking system
by supporting obligations associated with the rollover of certificates of deposit and inter-
bank credit lines.7 The Treasury Department made $3 billion of this aid available immedi-
ately upon the effective date of the agreements, and thereafter made a second installment of
$3 billion in loans available to Mexico on April 17, 1995.8 Secretary Rubin stated that the
decision to release this tranche of support was based upon Mexico's continued full compli-
ance with the terms of the agreements, dearly indicating that Mexico is in fact meeting those
obligations to report information in a timely and forthright manner so that the U.S.
Treasury and financial market participants can monitor the country's progress.
9
B. THE ZEDILLO ECONOMIC AusTEuTr PAN
Although some dissenters certainly existed, most Mexican business and labor leaders
gave qualified support to the new economic austerity plan proposed by the Zedillo
Administration on March 9, 1995. Finance Secretary Ortiz, in a presentation of the eco-
nomic austerity plan on March 9, admitted the harsh measures would impose "high costs
on the population" but the resulting plan was the only alternative for an economic
recovery.l° The Mexican's government's austerity plan, which became effective April 1,




8. See 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 698 (Apr. 19, 1995).
9. See 12 Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 8. However, members of the U.S. Congress have expressed
much skepticism concerning the U.S. aid package. For an analysis thereof, see 12 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 8, at 345 (Feb. 22, 1995) (lawmakers sponsoring resolution seeking details on Mexico
rescue plan); 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 418 (Mar. 1, 1995) (House Banking Committee
approves resolution seeking Mexico plan details); 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 593 (Mar.
29, 1995) (stating that detailed monthly reports on Mexico will be required under Resolution
S384 approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 22, 1995); 12 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 631 (Apr. 5, 1995) (House Republican Conference rejecting proposal seek-
ing to stop Mexico loans); 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 661 (Apr. 12, 1995) (U.S. Treasury
stating that the Clinton Administration is complying with the Congressional request for Mexico
documents).
10. 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 501 (Mar. 15, 1995). For an analysis of the Mexican business
sectors' dissent to the Zedillo economic austerity plan, see Business Sector One of Strongest Critics
of President Ernesto Zedillo's Economic Emergency Measures, SourceMex: Economic News &
Analysis on Mexico (Mar. 22, 1995).
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1. A 35% increase in gasoline and diesel prices which will be increased 0.8% each
month thereafter;
2. A 20% increase in electricity and gas billings, which will be increased monthly at
a rate of 0.8%;
3. A 2.5% increase in tariffs covering airport, tollroads or road holes, and railroad
services. Other prices and tariffs will be updated according to international pricing
standards to avoid any government subsidies;
4. A 50% increase in the value-added tax from 10% to 15%, which requires
Legislative approval. In tax-free and border areas-where most maquiladora compa-
nies are-the 10% sales tax will be maintained. The previous zero-tax status, which
applied to all production stages of processed foods and medicines, will now only
exempt the final consumer;
5.A 10% limit in wage increases;
6. Internal credit limits of 10 billion pesos in 1995 by the Central Bank to strength-
en the peso and gradually lower interest rates;
7. Deregulation and simplification of the application processes for the establish-
ment of new businesses;
8. Strengthening the banking system with a $2.25 billion package provided by the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (LADB); 11 and
9. As of March 23, 1995, replacing the Average Interbank Rate (TIP) with the
Interbank Equilibrium Rate (TIE) as Mexico's leading lending rate. 12 The TIE will pro-
vide a less inflation-sensitive index, and is quoted daily.'3 As of March 23, 1995, the
TIE stood at 90.5%, while the TIP measured 90.05%. 14
The economic austerity plan is one of the obligations that Mexico assumed under the
$50 billion credit package granted by the United States, the International Monetary Fund
and others to help solve the crisis induced by the peso devaluation. Of course, this added
fiscal burden is quite harsh on Mexican businesses, which already face high interest rates,
currency exchange losses, and a market contraction. However, with reference to opposition
within the business and labor sectors, Secretary Ortiz added that, without a coordinated
effort, Mexico "could risk, through a context of more uncertainty, going into an inflationary
spiral of wages and salaries that could lead to hyperinflation causing a dismembering of the
productive apparatus and higher social costs.?1 Both the U.S. Treasury and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund apparently welcomed Mexico's new austerity plan. U.S. Treasury
Secretary Rubin asserted that "the stringent measures announced ... are a major step for-
ward, and we should recognize the political courage involved in taking these steps.' 16 Rubin
concurrently announced the approval of the first disbursement of $3 billion for medium-
term credits to Mexico from the $20 billion package of U.S. financing; the $3 billion being
11. 12 Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 10.
12. See Mexico: Reserves Sink, Despite Reserve Package; Credit Still Shrinking Economist Intelligence
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drawn from the Exchange Stabilization Fund is in addition to the $2 billion in swaps that
remain outstanding as short-term loans which Mexico borrowed under earlier arrange-
ments. 17 Rubin reportedly told the U.S. Senate Banking Committee that Mexico will use
the $3 billion solely for its public sector debt, to either retire or stretch out debt, including
Tesobonos 18 (as the Banco de Mexico now offers to pay holders of Tesobonos directly in
U.S. dollars). In addition, Stanley Fischer, the International Monetary Fund's First Deputy
Managing Director, asserted in a released statement that "the management of the IMF wel-
comes the substantive measures adopted by the Mexican authorities to strengthen their eco-
nomic program. This program is being supported by an IMF stand-by arrangement in the
amount of $12.1 billion special drawing rights, concurrently equivalent to about $18.6 bil-
lion, which was approved on February 1, 1995.19
Finally, on March 9, 1995, the World Bank and the IADB announced the approval of
loans totalling $3.25 billion to help the Mexican government support the country's ailing
banking sector and enhance the country's social assistance programs. 20 This funding
includes $2.25 billion for the banking system, including $1.5 billion from the World Bank
and $750 million from the IADB; these funds will be channeled to the CNB and the Savings
Protection Fund (Fombo Bancario de Protection al Ahorro (FOBAPROA)). 2 1 The World
Bank and the IADB stated that the funds will be available to guaranty the solvency of
Mexican banks, strengthen audit procedures, create mechanisms that reduce the credit risks
for inter-bank loans, and establish a system to assist with the restructuring of corporate
debt.22 The World Bank and IADB also approved $1 billion in loans for programs to assist
the social sectors most valuable to the economic crisis facing Mexico. Each of the two insti-
tutions will contribute about $500 million of the total loans.2 3 These loans will be chan-
neled to advanced programs in the areas of education, health and nutrition, and job train-
ing; the new funding for these programs could be crucial, given the Mexican government's
commitment and the economic austerity plan to reduce government expenditures by 10%
during 1995.24
C. WiLL THESE PLANS AcruALLY WoRK?
Although there are many theories on whether the Mexican government's new austerity
plan and the capital infusions by the United States, IMF, World Bank; IADB and others will
succeed, there are two key factors which could determine the program's success or failure:
the Mexican government's ability to prevent massive bankruptcies, and the reaction of the




20. See World Bank & Inter-American Development Bank Announce Loans to Support Banking Systems
& Social Programs in Mexico, SourceMex: Economic News & Analysis on Mexico (U.N.M. Mar.






Administration. 25 In the first instance, the Mexican government must at least partially
restructure most of the private sector debts in order to forestall massive corporate bank-
ruptcies. The government has already initiated a debt renegotiation program that was
drawn up cooperatively with the banking industry organization (Asociation Mexicana de
Bancos (AMB)). 26 The majority of the financial resources used for the debt restructuring
originate from the World Bank and IADB infusions or loans. However, the funds available
under the restructuring program will cover only about 65 billion nuevo pesos (US$10.36
billion) or the equivalent of only 12% of the debt owed to commercial banks; this implies
that the assistance will reach a very limited number of companies.2 7 Recession will likely
make it impossible for the Mexican economy to absorb the estimated I million new workers
expected to enter the workforce in 1995.28 In addition, a projected inflation rate of more
than 42% for 1995 will undoubtedly reduce the purchasing power of all Mexican citizens,
and the Mexican government expects a 20% decline in real salaries for those workers who
manage to retain their jobs.2 9 Hence, the risk of a "social explosion" in the forthcoming
months is quite possible, and has forced the Mexican government to take some steps to off-
set the impact of the economic austerity program on low-income groups, including (i) the
expansion of social security benefits for newly unemployed workers, and (ii) boosting the
minimum wage by an additional 12% over the formerly approved 10% increase in early
1995. 30 Thus, the Mexican government's economic austerity program may yet fail given the
extent of the problems facing the business sector and the immense social impact of the eco-
nomic program on the country's low-income groups. The combination of these problems
may produce a sharp decline in consumption, which could in turn force almost 30% of all
companies in Mexico into bankruptcy, according to some estimates. 3 1 Under these condi-
tions, the population may not be able to withstand the economic pressures, and social and
political conflicts could be expected to explode in Mexico.32
25. See Commentary on Mexico's Emergency Economic Program, SourceMex: Economic News &
Analysis on Mexico (U.N.M. Apr. 19, 1995), available on LEGUS.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. IM. For an analysis of Mexico's unemployment and other employment-related issues following
the peso devaluation, see Joshua A. Cohen, American Chamber/Mexico Surveys the Devaluation's
Effect on Company Costs and Workers' Wages, Business Mexico (Jan.-Feb. 1995); Government's
Emergency Economic Program Expected to Worsen Already Difficult Unemployment Problems,
SourceMex: Economic News & Analysis on Mexico (U.N.M. Mar. 29, 1995).
29. SourceMex, supra note 25.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. For example, on May 1, 1995, more than 100,000 demonstrators marched to the Zocalo, the
vast central square in Mexico City, to protest against President Zedillo's economic program. See
Leslie Crawford, Protestors March Against Zedillo, The Financial Times, Ltd. (May 2, 1995); see
also Steve Fainaru, Mexican Recovery Coming at Cost; The Boston Globe (Apr. 27, 1995).
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III. Regulatory Initiatives in the Mexican Banking System
A. TEMPoRARY MEASURFS
Mexico's private commercial banks faced increasing pressure in recent months from
both the Executive Branch and the Legislature to take steps to help the government address
the impact of the peso devaluation on the Mexican economy.3 3 High interest rates, which
have, as of March 1995, tripled to about 90% since the December 20, 1994 peso devalua-
tion, are forcing many businesses, agricultural producers, and private consumers to default
on their loans.-" The non-payment of loans, in turn, has created difficult conditions for
Mexican commercial banks, many of which may approach or reach bankruptcy in 1995.
According to some estimates, overdue debts in 1995 are expected to approach 20% of all
outstanding commercial loans.35 The increase in overdue loans and the rising level of bank-
ruptcies led Mexican legislators and government officials to impose new restrictions on
Mexican commercial banks:.
1. On February 28, 1995, the banking regulatory agency (Comision Nacional
Bancaria (CNB)) ordered Mexican banks to increase the ratio of reserves on hand to at
least 60% from the prevailing rate of about 50% to cover overdue debts.3 6 The CNB
directive was intended to help Mexico's financial institutions address the expected wave
of bankruptcies and defaults by Mexican companies weakened by the peso devaluation
crisis.3 7 However, banking executives expressed concerns about the directive since the
requirement would cause many financial institutions to forego profits or even to enter
into debt themselves.3 8 Nevertheless, Banco de Mexico Governor Miguel Mancera
defended the reserve requirement, stating that it would boost the amount of reserves
available to address bankruptcies to about 4 billion nuevo pesos (US$570 million);39
and
2. On March 3, 1995, members of the Chamber of Deputies met with banking
executives to express their concerns about high interest rates. During the meeting,
attended by members of the four political parties represented in the legislature, bankers
were given an ultimatum to work with the Finance Secretariat and Agriculture
Secretariat to resolve the problem of overdue loans, which were becoming a drain on
the Mexican economy.
4 0
33. See Banking Sector Facing Increasing Strain from Peso Devaluation, SourceMex: Economic News &
Analysis on Mexico (U.N.M. Mar. 8, 1995), available on LEXIS.
34. See SourceMex, supra note 34. For an analysis of the peso devaluations effect on the agricultural
sector, see The Growing Sentiment: Devaluation Feeds All Kinds of Speculation on Agriculture,
Business Mexico (Mar. 1995).
35. Id. See also Baron Levin, Banking System May Suffer But Will Definitely Survive: A Bank Statement
for '95, Business Mexico (Jan.-Feb. 1995); Mexico: Fears Grow on Mexico Banking System Health,
Euroweek (Mar. 3, 1995).






The Zedillo Administration also created a special program to capitalize the banking
system, termed as the Programa de Capitalizacion Temporal (Procapte), and is aimed at
helping financial institutions raise needed funds by providing emergency government loans
to the banking sector.41 The Procapte program will provide a total of approximately $11.6
billion of capital injections to improve the banking sector in 1995. These funds include the
$3.25 billion pledged by the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. 42 On
March 31, 1995, the CNB confirmed that six banks have received a total of 6.48 billion
nuevo pesos (US$1.03 billion) from the Procapte program to allow them to comply with
the capitalization levels of at least 8% required by the Mexican government. 43 Although all
other Mexican commercial banks have already met the government's minimum capitaliza-
tion requirement and will not need Procapte assistance in 1995, in late March 1995 the
credit administration agency (Cistemas de Administracion y Control de Credito (SAC))
released a report indicating that only 4 of out Mexico's 18 commercial banks had enough
resources to meet all obligations, in the case that all depositors suddenly decided to with-
draw their funds.44
B. INTRODUCTION OF NEw FiNANcAL INSTRUMENTS
In addition, the Zedillo Administration and the Banco de Mexico have unveiled two
new financial instruments designed to assist small-scale and medium-sized agricultural
producers and businesses deal with the high interest rates and inflation that followed the
devaluation of the peso. These instruments-a new unit of value dubbed Univades de
Inversion (UDIs), and a program allowing Mexican banks toparticipate in futures market
transactions-were enacted or approved during March 1995.45
1. The UDI Program
The UDIs are basically financial accounting units, indexed to the inflation rate, by
which as much as a quarter to a third of all loans in the Mexican banking system-largely
short-term debt-will be restructured over a time span of 2 to 12 years.46 Although origi-
nally conceived as a rescue package of about 64 billion nuevo pesos (approximately US$9.8
billion) to cover 12% of the banking system's loan portfolio, the amount is growing daily
and, according to the CNB, will in all likelihood reach 140 billion nuevo pesos (approxi-
mately US$21.5 billion).47 The UJDI scheme was approved by an unusually united Mexican
Congress, although many of the Mexican politicians confessed that they were baffled by the
scale and complexity of the arrangements, and even economic and financial specialists are
41. Id.
42. See Six Banks Receive Assistance from State-Run Bank Capitalization Fund, SourceMex Economic
News & Analysis on Mexico (U.N.M. Apr. 12, 1995), available on LEXIS.
43. Id.
44. IcL
45. See Government Unveils Two New Instruments to Help Businesses Cope with High Interest Rates 6
Uncertainties of Peso-Dollar Rates, SourceMex: Economic News & Analysis on Mexico (U.N.M.
Apr. 5, 1995), available on LEXIS.
46. See Mexico: Saving the Banks, 1995 Economist Intelligence Unit CApr. 1, 1995), available on LEXIS:
47. Id.
144 NAFT law and Business Review of the Americas
still attempting to decipher its future fiscal and monetary implications. In essence, the UDI
program will work as follows:
a. Mexican commercial banks will transfer their non-performing loans to off-
balance trust funds controlled by the Banco de Mexico. These will be converted
into indexed units of deposit or UDIs. The principal will appreciate in line with
inflation, and the loans will carry real interest rates of up to 12%. The reduction in
interest charges-the inflation component having been stripped out-should
enable borrowers to service the loans. Once the economy has emerged from reces-
sion and growth resumes, borrowers should be in a better position to repay the
accumulated principal as well. 48
b. The commercial banks will in turn receive zero-coupon bonds from the
Mexican government, via the Banco de Mexico, in return for the non-performing
loans deposited in the trust. The maturity of the bonds will match that of the
restructured loans.49 The bonds will pay 28-day Treasury certificate (Cetes) rates
(approximately 74%, as of April 1995), but the interest will be capitalized and be
paid only on maturity of the bonds. The trust, meanwhile, will pay to the Banco de
Mexico 4% interest on the appreciating indexed value of the loans which they are
holding.50
c. Any fiscal or monetary effects will only become apparent once the govern-
ment bonds reach maturity. Any bonds which are not matched by the maturing
bank loans held in the trust due to insolvency of the borrowers will likely have to
be covered by new government borrowing. 5 1
d. The basic gamble of this program is that the poor-quality loans will eventu-
ally become better-quality ones as Mexico pulls out of its recession and markets
and corporate cashflows improve. If recovery is delayed and inflation and interest
rates do not drop as rapidly as anticipated, then the larger problems will be the
potential fiscal and monetary tightening some two years down the road, when the
first of the new bonds, some of which may not be matched by principle repay-
ments on the restructured bank loans, mature.52
e. In the meantime, a remaining fear is that the indexing of these loans will
encourage indexation of financial contracts throughout the Mexican economy,
thus making it more difficult to reduce inflation.53
Although the UDIs have emerged as an ingenious means of allowing Mexican banks to
swap their "bad debt for good debt," thereby possibly averting a wholesale banking collapse,
the Mexican banking officials have emphasized that UDIs will benefit only those businesses








these companies to restructure their debt to stretch out payments over periods of 5 or 10
years.54
The Zedillo Administration put the UDI program to its initial test in the public sector
when it announced on May 4, 1995 that all 17.4 billion nuevo peso state and local govern-
ment debt owed to commercial banks would be open to UDI restructuring. 55 This amount
was added to the 76 billion nuevo pesos of UDIs already promised by the Administration
for restructuring business debts.56 The state infrastructure development bank, Banobras,
then announced that it would begin to restructure much of the 9.6 billion nuevo peso state
and local government debt on its books. 57 State and local debt represents between 3% and
5% of the total portfolio of the commercial banks.58 Under an agreement between the
Ministry of Finance, the CNB and the Mexican Bank Association, state and local govern-
ments will pay a proportion of outstanding capital and submit proposals to streamline
finances in return for lower interest rates.59 For state and local governments which amor-
tize 10%, 20% and 30% of capital owed, banks will charge real interest rates of 9.5%, 8.5%,
and 7.5%, respectively.60 The individual UDI deals will be worked up by negotiations
between states and their creditor banks, and is expected to be carried out in the second half
of 1995.61 However, it is as of yet unclear whether some of the worst afflicted states will be
able to amortize even 10% of their debt.62 The UDI program for businesses has a July 31,
1995 deadline for the restructuring of state savings accounts to finance UDI loans, the
longer-term indexed-linked capital may only be financed by short-term, floating-rate
loans.63 This may leave the banks and the government trusts which hold the UDIs taking
on inflation risk responsibility that has not been adequately proportioned and would grow
worse as successive schemes introduce more UDI loans without their deposit counter-
parts.64 Moreover, even as the first priority of the Mexican banks is to restructure debt,
there is no guaranty that the debtors will be able to pay off the UDI loans.65
2. Peso-Indexed Futures and Option Contracts
On a related matter, the Banco de Mexico announced on March 19, 1995 that Mexican
commercial banks have been authorized to participate in the purchase of futures contracts
at the foreign currency futures market of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), based
54. See SourceMex, supra note 46.
55. See Daniel Dombey, Doubts Rise Over UDI Plan, LDC Debt Report/Latin American Markets
(May 15, 1995), available on LEXIS.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. See also Economic Crisis Caused by Peso Devaluation Creates Difficulties for State & Local
Governments, SourceMex: Economic News & Analysis on Mexico (Apr. 26, 1995); Mark
Stevenson, Mexico to Rescue Indebted States, U.P.I. (May 4, 1995).
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upon the anticipated value of the peso in relation to the U.S. dollar.6 6 The banks have been
authorized to conduct these transactions at the CME either for themselves or on behalf of
customers. Through the purchase of a futures contract, Mexican banks will be able to lock
in a price in U.S. dollars for pesos, thus creating an element of certainty for the peso-dollar
exchange rate and allow both themselves and corporate customers to hedge their currency
risk against fluctuations in the peso-dollar exchange rate. Hence, on April 25, 1995, the
CME introduced futures and options contracts on the Mexican peso, marking the first time
in 10 years that peso futures and options have been traded on the exchange. 67 The peso
futures and options are the first CME contracts launched (i) as part of the exchange's new
emerging markets initiatives, and (ii) to respond to investor demand for products to man-
age foreign-exchange risk and peso-denominated transactions and investments. 68
IV NAFTA Issues and Other Regulatory Initiatives
A. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE PESO DEVAUATION
The Zedillo Administration has attempted to sell long-term benefits of the peso deval-
uation in terms of future net gains and increased exports.69 As construed, the forecasted
value of the peso for 1995 (4.5 nuevo pesos for US$1) is projected to erode the problem of
currency overvaluation and thus give domestic Mexican products a competitive edge in the
international marketplace. 70 This, together with a more expensive dollar, is supposed to
curb import growth and thereby halt a disproportionate increase in Mexico's current-
account deficit.7 1 However, the critical inquiry in this regard is whether a cheaper currency
will constitute a sufficient condition to stimulate high export-led economic growth: the
Mexican government asserts that it can. 72 The early projections for 1995 placed the post-
devaluation current-account deficit at more than half the amount expected before the
exchange-rate adjustment: $14 billion, which is equivalent to 4.2% of gross domestic prod-
uct.7 3 Total exports were expected to reach 22.6% of gross domestic product, spurred by
growth in the manufacturing sector. The growth in the manufacturing sector, which is
higher than the original pre-devaluation forecast of 17.3%. 74 Thus, in principle, these early
estimates reflected the logic of the view that the peso devaluation will increase exports,
decrease imports, and therefore erase a great deal of undesirable "red ink" in Mexico's cur-
rent account.
75
The Zedillo Administration's "strategy" apparently worked in the early stages, as the
most significant impact of the peso devaluation was the reversal of Mexico's trade balance
66. Id.
67. See 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 787 (May 3, 1995).
68. Id.









from a deficit to a surplus. 76 According to preliminary government estimates, Mexico
attained a trade surplus of approximately $380 million in March 1995, compared with a
trade deficit of $1.3 billion during the same month in 1994. 77 However, on April 7, 1995,
the Banco de Mexico countered this news in reporting that the consumer price index
(Indice Nacional de Precios al Consumnibor (IMPG)) surged by 5.9% in March 1995 alone,
bringing the accumulated inflation for the January-March quarter to 14.54%.78 The rela-
tively high rate for the first quarter of 1995 raised concerns over whether Zedillo's
Administration would be able to meet its target of 42% annual inflation for 1995. 79 In
order to reach that target, the inflation rate would have to be limited to an average of slight-
ly more than 3% each month from April through December 1995.80 However, the econom-
ic austerity measures enacted by the Zedillo Administration notably include higher costs for
gasoline and electricity, and a sharp increase in the value-added tax; both measures are
highly inflationary.8 1 Significantly, many economists attributed the surge in inflation dur-
ing March 1995 to transportation-related costs in the form of sharp increases in public
transportation fares and gasoline prices. 82 However, even assuming that the Zedillo
Administration meets its target for inflation growth and assuming that the peso continues
to trade at the current rate of 5.70 per dollar (as of February 1, 1995) for the rest of 1995
and that U.S. and Mexican inflation and Mexican industrial production continue to grow at
current levels, many economists forecasted that U.S. exports to Mexico would be cut by
50% or $27.5 billion in 1995.83 Hence, the forecasts asserted that $24.7 billion in real U.S.
-gross domestic product would be lost as a result of the peso devaluation.84
B. INTERNATIONAL TRAiE ASPECTS OF THE PESO DEVALUATION
1. U.S. -Mexico Trade Relations
The reversal of the trade deficit and the increasing of tariffs have apparently shed a dif-
ferent light on Mexico's NAFTA obligations and trade disputes with the United States and
other countries. First, Mexican government and industry have engaged in close consulta-
tions on which sectors should proceed with the accelerated tariff reductions under the
NAFTA. Speaking at a forum on Western Hemisphere integration at Georgetown Univer-
sity, Raul Urteaga, Economic Advisor for the Mexican Embassy's NAFTA Office, comment-
ed that Mexican industry, as a result of Mexico's current economic climate, is taking a hard
look at accelerated reductions of Mexican tariffs.85 Urteaga cited the services sector as an
76. See Peso Devaluation Has Varied Impact on Mexican Trade Disputes with Other Countries,
SourceMex: Economic News & Analysis on Mexico (U.N.M. Apr. 26, 1995), available on LEXIS.
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area where liberalization under NAFTA could be accelerated consistent with privatization in
Mexico. 86 Although the NAFTA requires gradual elimination of tariffs on goods and ser-
vices traded between the signatory countries over 15 years, it also provides for accelerating
those eliminations in negotiations between the signatory countries. 87 Second, a handful of
trade disputes between the United States and Mexico gained prominence in early 1995.
These included the following:
a. On February 9, 1995, the Telephone Workers Union of the Republic of
Mexico announced that it would initiate proceedings against Sprint Corp. under
provisions of the NAFTA, the first complaint filed by a Mexican Union against a
U.S. corporation.8 8 The Union charged that the company's dismissal of 235
employees who attempted to unionize a subsidiary in San Francisco, California ran
afoul of its obligations under the trade pacts labor side agreement. 89 The com-
plaint is the first filed with Mexico's National Administrative Office (NAO)--one
of the bodies established by the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC) to review allegations of non-compliance with certain guaranteed labor
standards, induding the right to organize.90 The National Labor Relations Board's
subsequent request for an injunction was denied and the parties are currently
awaiting a decision from the administrative law judge who held a hearing on the
dispute.9 The Union's complaint requested that the NAO prohibit Sprint Corp.
from establishing itself in Mexico "given its track record of abuses against workers
who are seeking to organize unions freely and independently. 9 2 The complaint
also charged that denial of the injunction "constitutes a serious violation" of the
NAALC by U.S. authorities. 93 The delayed outcome of the hearing and possibility
of an appeal "could prolong the proceeding for another 2-3 years," the complaint
asserted. 4 Miguel Angel Orozco, Secretary of the Labor and Welfare Secretariat's
NAO in Mexico, asserted on May 4, 1995 that his office's decision to pursue the
Sprint case is not related to a report issued by the U.S. NAO, which on April 11,
1995 concluded that the Mexican Government improperly handled an unfair dis-
missal complaint by 45 Sony workers in Mexico who had tried to form an indepen-
dent union.95 Orozco stated that the Mexican NAO will issue a final report on the
Sprint case sometime in late May 1995, and the report will either dismiss the case
or request miriisterial consultations from the U.S. NAO. 96
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b. The first NAFTA Trade Dispute Resolution Panel met in Mexico City on
April 20, 1995, to discuss Mexican anti-dumping tariffs against imports of flat steel
'from the United States. 97 Thirty-eight percent duties were imposed in 1994
against several U.S. steel producers; companies affected by the duties from the two
countries were due to present testimony before the panel. However, no decision is
immediately expected in the case, and the panel itself has set a deadline for its
decision of July 13, 1995.98 The panel was composed of five members, two each
from the United States and Mexico, and a fifth designated through mutual agree-
ment of the parties. 99
c. In a separate U.S.-Mexico dispute, the U.S. International Trade Commission
(ITC), in a 5-0 decision issued on April 18, 1995 decided against taking any provi-
sional relief against imports of Mexican tomatoes. 100 In its decision, the ITC
denied a request by Florida tomato growers for provisional tariffs of up to 50% on
Mexican winter tomatoes under Section 202 of the 1974 Trade Act, given that only
four days remained in the winter crops' cycle. 10 1 However, the ITC stated that it
will continue the investigation through July 1995 under Section 201 of the Act to
determine if Florida farmers are entitled to any special government assistance. 10 2
The Florida tomato case differs from traditional dumping complaints because no
unfair trading practices were alleged against Mexican firms. Instead, the ITC must
determine if imports of fresh winter tomatoes during January-April are a substan-
tial cause of injury, or threatens serious injury to U.S. industry.)0
d. On April 26, 1995, officials from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
confirmed that the United States asked Mexico for formal consultations under
Chapter 20 of the NAFTA on Mexico's alleged failure to provide national treatment
to a U.S.-owned express delivery company.104 The United Parcel Service, in an
April 26, 1995 press statement, expressed support for the action, stating that
Mexico failed to meet its NAFTA obligation to grant U.S. express delivery compa-
nies the right to operate the same-sized vehicles as their Mexican competitors. 105
This is the first case the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has initiated against
Mexico under Chapter 20, which establishes institutions responsible for assisting in
avoidance and resolution of disputes among the parties on the interpretation of the
NAFTA. 10 6 Article 2006 of the NAFTA provides that a country which comprises
the top 8 officials of the NAFTA signatory countries, must convene in 10 days to
consider the matter. 10 7 In the same press statement, UPF officials claimed that
97. See Mark Stevenson, NAFTA Shows Signs of Strain, U.P.I. (Apr. 20, 1995), available on LEXIS.
98. See SourceMex, supra note 78.
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Mexico not only is not meeting its NAFTA commitments, but has attempted to fur-
ther inhibit competition: "U.S. express delivery companies are faced with pending
regulations requiring them to divest of services they were able to offer prior to
NAFTA, for providing across-the-board exemptions to Mexican carriers," it stat-
ed.108 Investigation of these charges will certainly carry through to the end of 1995.
In addition, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, in a report listing foreign trade
barriers--stated that U.S. exporters to Mexico experienced difficulties in certain areas dur-
ing the first year of the NAFTA's implementation due to Mexico's administration of its cus-
toms and trade regulations. 109 The report listed Mexico's new certificate of origin require-
ments for non-NAFTA goods, 110 as well as a March 7, 1995 Mexican labeling decree as
areas of primary concern. I 11 The report listed laborious inspections at the U.S.-Mexican
border, cumbersome NAFTA origin audit procedures, difficulty in dearing low-value ship-
ments to importers not on the import registry, and unavailability of reliable information on
Mexican regulations as among the customs-related problems.11 2 Several examples of these
and other related issues detailed in the report include the following:.
a. Although Mexico converted its import licensing requirements to tariff-rate
quotas (TRQs) as a part of NAFTA's agricultural provisions, but the United States
has received little timely information on how the TRQs are being filled;
b. U.S. exporters have encountered difficulties as a result of Mexican imple-
mentation of standards regulations, and pointed to a March 7, 1994 decree (effec-
tive the following day), which identified imported goods subject to Mexican label-
ing, products standards, and certification requirements;
c. In the latter half of 1994, Mexico restructured procedures for testing and
certification of products subject to mandatory safety and performance standards,
but the requirement that all testing be done in Mexican laboratories occasionally
presented conflicts of interest where the only accredited lab belonged to the
importer's domestic competition;
d. In addition, the report delineated that certain U.S. agricultural goods, such
as potatoes, cherries and cling peaches, encountered barriers in Mexico in the form
of phytosanitary standards; and
e. Finally, the report noted that specific concerns on the protection of intellec-
tual property remain, specifically in the form of the absence of criminal prosecu-
tions of violations; for instance, apparently "no corrective action" has been taken
in recent months to make the legal provision in the Industrial Property Law that
contains a "troublesome" provision against film-dubbing consistent with NAFTA
requirements. 113
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2. Protectionist Trade Measures Taken Against Other Nations
Third, the Zedillo Administration announced on February 28, 1995 that tariffs on
imports coming from countries that are not engaged in trade accords with Mexico will be
elevated to the "maximum levels consolidated by Mexico in the World Trade Organiza-
tion." 114 Conversely, President Zedillo said that Mexico's trade agreements with other
countries (including the United States, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Columbia, Venezuela and
Bolivia) "provide enough safeguards for the national industry."115 Hence, the Zedillo
Administration asserted that it will impose temporary quotas for the importation of cloth-
ing products because Mexican producers are being severely affected under the peso devalu-
ation, and stated that Mexico will "negotiate" with its trade partners on the adoption of
these quotas. 116 President Zedillo emphasized that these measures were temporary and
based on the "lack of reciprocity that our producers are confronting in those markets 117
and thus informed the World Trade Organization that it would raise to 35% import tariffs
for apparel, shoes and leather products. 118 Although U.S.-made goods in this regard are not
directly affected by the announcement, U.S. retailers and companies specializing in footwear
strongly criticized the Mexican tariff-type plans as they frequently market footwear prod-
ucts made in Asia for importation into Mexico. 119
3. European Union-Mexico Initiatives
Even as the Zedillo Administration imposed new tariffs on countries that are not cur-
rently engaged in trade accords with Mexico, on April 10, 1995 the European Union foreign
ministers approved a European Commission strategy paper recommending trade liberaliza-
tion and a reinforced economic relationship with Mexico that could lead to an eventual free
trade agreement. 120 The ministers called on the European Commission to present them
with a concrete proposal to negotiate a new political, trade and economic agreement with
Mexico by the end of 1995. "With the unanimous vote by the 15 ministers, we now have an
EU strategy towards Mexico, rather than just a permission strategy," said Josep Coll I.
Carbo, spokesman for Manuel Marin, the European Commissioner responsible for external
relations with Latin America.12 1 European Union and Mexican authorities also finalized a
formal declaration of their intention to work together more closely, which they hope to sign
in the near future.122 The declaration text develops a new accord between the two trade
partners that would include progressive and reciprocal trade liberalization for goods, ser-
vices, and investment, in line with World Trade Organization rules, 123 and further would
reinforce cooperation in business, industrial technology, telecommunications, scientific
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research and political issues between the two parties. 124 Further, the dedaration calls on the
European Investment Bank, the EU's independent, long-term lending institution that assists
in financing capital investment projects in Europe and in countries with cooperation agree-
ments, to increase its activity in Mexico. 125 Although some Commission officials question
reinforcing relations with only one member of the NAFTA, the EU executive ministers
decided that it was still necessary to keep and strengthen bilateral ties with the individual
NAFTA signatory countries. 12 6
C. MAJOR LEGAL INnmITivEs IN MFXICO FEBRUARY-MAY 1995
The Zedillo Administration also introduced several regulatory initiatives intended to
revive foreign investment in several of the ailing sectors of its economy. The proposed rules
and regulations include the following:
1. On February 4, 1995, the Zedillo Administration announced that regula-
tions which would commission new railroad and satellite concessions-among
them the amount of foreign participation-would be sent to the Mexican
Congress in April 1995. 12 7Carlos Ruiz Sacristan, head of the Secretariat of
Communications and Transport, stated that the new regulations-which make
necessary changes in the Law of General Means of Communications (Ley. de Vias
Generales de Comunicacion)-would define the technical and financial condi-
tions that foreign participants must meet, the service areas each concession will
cover, and the limits in foreign investment under each one. 128 Along with the pri-
vatization of railroads and satellites, Ruiz stated that the agency would also grant
other concessions in the seaport and airport systems as part of a comprehensive
strategy that would attempt to connect Mexico's transportation network. 1
2 9
2. On February 15, 1995, the Zedillo Administration published new regula-
tions in the Diario Oficial which permit greater foreign participation (up to 49%
ownership, or more with the authorization of the Finance Secretariat) in the own-
ership of Mexican commercial banks. 130 However, although the serious liquidity
problems facing the Mexican banking system have cut share prices and made some
banks appear to be attractive investment targets, there is so far little indication of
any significant inflow of foreign capital into that sector. 
13 1
3. On April 26, 1995, the Mexican Senate approved legislation that will allow
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proposed Law of Telecommunications does not address the subject of whether
high fees will be charged to telecommunication companies entering the Mexican
market, it does state that foreign companies will be limited to 49% ownership in
joint ventures providing basic telephone, long-distance, and cellular services.133
The proposed legislation also limits licensing concessions granted solely for the use
of radio spectrum and satellites for up to 20 years, and will be renewable subject to
conditions to be determined in the future.134 As of May 3, 1995, commentators
asserted that the legislation has since moved to the House of Representatives,
where it is expected to pass within the next couple of weeks. 135 Most of the major
U.S. corporate players-AT&T, MCI, GTE, Sprint, Motorola, TeleGlobe and Bell
Atlantic-have already forged strategic alliances with Mexican parmers in readi-
ness for the opening of Mexico's long-distance telecommunications market in
January 1997.136 However, major European carriers are largely uninvolved, pri-
marily because 80% of Mexico's international calls are made to the United
States. 137
4. On April 27, 1995, the Mexican Ministry of Finance and Public Credit
issued guidelines for maquiladora companies (foreign-owned export manufactur-
ing firms that are allowed to import component parts duty-free) to assist them in
complying with Mexico's transfer pricing policies. 13 8 The guidelines delineate the
necessary steps that maquiladoras must follow to comply with Mexico's transfer
pricing laws. Although the maquiladoras did not have to comply with these laws
until the end of 1994, an amendment to Mexico's tax laws stated that those com-
panies would have to follow Mexico's transfer pricing regulations as of January 1,
1995.139 As per the amendment, maquiladoras must comply with the arms-length
principles in accordance with the guidelines established by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development: they must use the applicable methods
to establish transfer prices, such as the comparative uncontrolled price, resale
price, and cost-plus method. 140 The recent guidelines for complying with the
transfer pricing rules are designed to "ease compliance, provide legal certainty, and
simplify the administrative rocedures for maquiladoras" representatives of the
Ministry of Finance stated. 141 The guidelines provide maquiladoras with three
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(i) Maquiladoras that have a net profit of at least 5% of the value of all assets
for the fiscal 1995 year will be deemed to have complied with the transfer
pricing regulations;
(ii) If maquiladoras expected to have a net profit of at least 5% of the value
of assets but failed to do so as of the end of fiscal year 1995, can still com-
ply with the transfer pricing laws if they apply for an advance pricing
agreement; or
(iii) Maquiladoras that estimate less than 5% return on assets can also request
a unilateral or bilateral advance pricing agreement. 1
42
Under the first and third options, maquiladora companies must file a notice of
their election before May 31, 1995.143
5. On May 3, 1995, Mexico's Energy Regulatory Commission, the Comicion
Reguladoria de Energia, stated that new regulations allowing for private invest-
ment in the transportation, storage, and distribution of natural gas in Mexico were
being considered and should be released within six months. 144 Hector Olea
Hernandez, President of the Commission, stated that the agency will (i) help
define the terms under which the private sector can operate in Mexico's energy
sector, and (ii) seek to create a "family environment" for investors in order to pro-
mote private investment in the sector. 145 The new legislation was approved by the
Mexican Senate on April 30, 1995 after earlier approval in the House of
Representatives. 146 Even so, the exploration of petroleum and gas will be left in
the hands of PEMEX; the legislation specifies that only Mexican companies will be
permitted to build and operate facilities for distribution, storage, and transporta-
tion of natural gas, but will allow foreign companies to have a large (but still
unspecified) percentage of ownership in those activities. 14 7 The purpose of this
legislation is fairly dear: while Mexico has large reserves of natural gas, PEMEX's
distribution system for the fuel is considered to be inadequate, as only two main
pipelines for the transport of natural gas currently exist, and much of Mexico still
remains unserved. 14 8 Thus, by attracting private investment for the aforemen-
tioned activities, the Commission hopes that this investment will "free up"
PEMEX's resources for exploration, and will eventually lead to Mexico being a net
natural gas exporter. 14 9
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The Zedillo Administration will undoubtedly be enmeshed in a political and economic
impasse for the remainder of 1995 as its economic austerity plan and accompanying regula-
tory initiatives will have both positive and negative effects on the Mexican economy and
population. However, the author would assert that it is up to the international trade and
investment community to recognize the deleterious position of the Zedillo Administration,
and to guide and support Mexico's reemergence into a leading market for international
trade and investment. This support would most clearly be manifested by (i) foreign compa-
nies, investment mutual and pension funds and governments reinvesting in Mexico's banks
and equities market, and to likewise invest in the strategic sectors of the Mexican economy
that are now or will soon be open to foreign participation, and (ii) to utilize the newly cre-
ated CME futures and option peso contracts to hedge against peso currency risk in making
these investments.
-Christopher D. Olive
